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TOEING THE LINE IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT: PROPER
AGENCY JUSTIFICATION OF FOIA EXEMPTIONS
CLARIFIED IN WIENER v. FBI
INTRODUCTION
It is, sir . . . the people's Government; made for the people; made by the
people; and answerable to the people.'
-Daniel Webster
Although deceptively simple and widely accepted, the ideal ex-
pressed by Daniel Webster has proven difficult to achieve. Our his-
tory reflects a constant struggle between the need to protect sensi-
tive government information and the right of the people to oversee
the workings of that government.2 A wealth of case law and legisla-
tion has evolved that addresses the delicate process of balancing
these conflicting needs.3 The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)'
exemplifies one congressional attempt to provide a statutory means
to resolve the problem. However, FOIA also demonstrates that a
flood of litigation and varied judicial interpretation can result from
a seemingly straightforward statute. Quite simply, FOIA gives the
public the general right to obtain information from the government
but retains protection for sensitive information by providing statu-
tory exemptions. The apparent simplicity of FOIA's scheme is be-
lied by the steady stream of cases involving FOIA requests which
the federal courts across the country must hear and adjudicate.
This Note examines how Wiener v. FBI,' a recent Ninth Circuit
1. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 431 (1830) (debating Foot's Resolution, which resulted in discussion
of the doctrine of nullification).
2. Bruce E. Fein, Access to Classified Information: Constitutional and Statutory Dimensions,
26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805, 812 (1985).
3. Id. at 819-27 (discussing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) and
progeny, the Freedom of Information Act, the Classified Information Procedures Act, and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act); see also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,
382 (1984) (discussing the critical role of information in informing public debate and editorial
content of broadcasts); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (reiterating
the right of the public to receive suitable access to all forms of information and ideas); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (noting that speech regarding public affairs is the essence of
self-government).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
5. 943 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992).
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opinion involving an author's request for FBI files, gives effect to
FOIA's mandate of answerability by providing a detailed road map
for agency response. Without purporting to analyze or debate the
relative merits of the statute in question, this Note evaluates the
impact of a particular case on the area of FOIA litigation, starting
with the premise that FOIA exists to serve its stated purpose-
that is, to promote the disclosure of information to the public.
The Background section traces the history and intent of FOIA, its
function, requirements, exemptions, and procedural use. The Back-
ground section also discusses the inception of the Vaughn index' in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia as
a means of providing adequate justification when a government
agency seeks to withhold information, along with its applications
prior to the Wiener case. A sampling of case law from various fed-
eral jurisdictions preceding Wiener illustrates the need for further
elaboration on the Vaughn index requirements. The Subject Opinion
section details the factual particulars and holdings of Wiener. The
Analysis section examines how the Wiener court construed the
Vaughn mandate, focusing on the way in which the opinion inter-
preted, expanded upon, and crystallized prior case law. The Impact
and Conclusion sections discuss how Wiener may affect future
agency responses and disclosure practices and its significance in
light of FOIA's purpose. This Note concludes that FOIA's funda-
mental and essential purpose of allowing the public maximum ac-
cess to information can be well served by universal adoption of the
stringent standards for exemption justification enunciated in Wiener.
I. BACKGROUND
FOIA was enacted as a means for the public to gain access to
information controlled by government agencies and to monitor the
operations of the government, but its provisions clearly reflect the
need to shield certain areas of information from disclosure.' The
Act provides statutory exemptions and sets out procedural require-
6. The district court in Vaughn v. Rosen formulated an indexing requirement under which a
court could determine information properly disclosed to the public. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); see infra notes 53-80 and accompanying text (discussing
the district court's decision in Vaughn).
7. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (listing areas excepted from disclosure). Some matters are specifically
authorized to be kept secret in the interest of national defense: matters related solely to the inter-
nal personnel rules and practices of an agency, trade secrets, and personnel and medical files. Id.
[Vol. 42:795
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ments for pursuing a claim under FOIA.8 When an agency fails to
disclose requested information, FOIA provides a remedy to the re-
quester in the federal courts.9 Before the 1973 Vaughn v. Rosen"0
decision, no uniform standards for justifying the withholding of in-
formation pursuant to FOIA exemptions existed. Vaughn developed
a basic format for agency response which resulted in the incorpora-
tion of the Vaughn index as a required aspect of FOIA litigation.
During the years between Vaughn and Wiener, myriad examples of
judicial interpretation and application of the Vaughn index have is-
sued from the federal courts. The diversity of these decisions em-
phasizes the need for the additional clarification provided by
Wiener.
A. The Purpose and Spirit of FOIA
Congress enacted FOIA in 1966 to allow public access to infor-
mation compiled by and pertaining to government agencies.11 FOIA
amended section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,2
which granted disclosure requests only to a narrow category of
"concerned" persons.'" FOIA, on the other hand, emphasized the
availability of records to "any person" without regard to that per-
son's interest.'4 Under FOIA, any member of the public may re-
quest from any agency "rules, opinions, orders, records and proceed-
ings.""5 The agency must provide the requested information unless it
falls within the scope of one of nine statutory exemptions set forth
in subsection (b) of FOIA. 6
8. Id. § 552(b)(4)(A)(i).
9. Id. § 552(b)(4)(B).
10. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946).
13. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2418, 2423 ("The statutory requirement thai information about routine administrative actions
need be given only to 'persons properly and directly concerned' has been relied upon . . . to with-
hold Government information from the public.").
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C); see also Mayock v. Nelson, 938 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a person's relative "need" for agency documents does not alter his or her rights
under FOIA); Kenneth Culp Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 761, 765 (1967).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 552; see also JUSTIN D. FRANKLIN & ROBERT F. BOUCHARD, GUIDEBOOK TO
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACTS 3-7 (1992) (giving examples of records avail-
able to the public through FOIA, including: descriptions of agency organization and office ad-
dresses; statements of agency operation; rules of procedure and description of forms; final opinions
made in the adjudication of cases; administrative staff manuals that affect the public).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9).
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FOIA was designed to facilitate access, a goal reflected both in its
language and its legislative history. 17 The general purpose of the
statute is to allow members of the public to avail themselves of their
right to acquire knowledge.' 8 FOIA permits individuals to access in-
formation about themselves and others that has been compiled and
maintained in government agency files.' 9 In addition to increasing
the availability of information to the public, FOIA also provides the
public with the opportunity to oversee the internal workings of the
government and to gain information of general interest.20 In effect,
FOIA disclosure empowers people to obtain the "answerability" en-
visioned by Daniel Webster 2' while serving the constitutional values
of self-government articulated by our nation's Founders.2" FOIA's
prodisclosure thrust does not ignore the need to protect certain types
of information. The nine statutory exemptions to FOIA recognize
the need to allow such information to remain secret.2" Although it
17. See HR. REP. No. 1497, supra note 13, at 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2423
("The right of the individual to be able to find out how his Government is operating can be just as
important to him as his right to privacy and his right to confide in his Government. [FOIA]
strikes a balance considering all these interests."); see also Kristi A. Miles, The Freedom of In-
formation Act: Shielding Agency Deliberations from FOIA Disclosure, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1326, 1328 (1989) (noting that the legislative intent of FOIA was to serve democratic values and
the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press).
18. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) ("The basic purpose of
FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed
to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed."); EPA v.
Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (noting that FOIA is broadly conceived to permit access to official
information previously unnecessarily shielded from public view); Department of Air Force v. Rose,
425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1973) (describing the basic purpose of FOIA as reflective of the general
philosophy of full agency disclosure).
19. See FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 15, at v.
20. See Karen A. Winchester & James W. Zirkle, Freedom of Information and the CIA Infor-
mation Act, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 231, 233 (1987); see also FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note
15, at 3-12 (noting that information is requested by three categories of requesters: the news media
and educational or noncommercial scientific institutions; commercial users involved in profit-mak-
ing activities; and the general public, public interest groups, and nonprofit organizations).
21. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 431 (1830).
22. See Fein, supra note 2, at 805 (quoting James Madison's August 4, 1822 letter to W.T.
Barry in which he observed that "a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm them-
selves with the power which knowledge gives").
23. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9). The legislative history of FOIA reflects the intent to achieve
a balance between the public's right to know and the need for secrecy. Congressman Moss re-
marked that:
[FOIA] is a moderate bill and carefully worked out. This measure is not intended
to impinge upon the appropriate power of the Executive or to harass the agencies of
Government. We are simply attempting to enforce a basic public right - the right to
access to Government information. We have expressed an intent in the report on this
bill which we hope the courts will read with great care.
112 CONG. REc. 13,642 (1966). Congresswoman Reid of Illinois commented that FOIA "contains
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might appear to countervail the public interest in freedom of access,
secrecy serves certain important national policy interests that the
government views as vital, such as national defense, foreign policy,
civilian cooperation with law enforcement authorities, and agency
efficiency.24 However, in order to keep the exception from devouring
the rule, these exemptions are narrowly construed.25
FOIA grants jurisdiction to the federal district courts and autho-
rizes them to enjoin an agency from withholding records.2" The
courts are also authorized to order the production of improperly
withheld records, to conduct a de novo review to determine the pro-
priety of withholding, and to conduct an in camera examination of
pertinent records to determine whether part or all of the documents
may be withheld .2  The burden of proof to "sustain its [denial of
access]" is expressly allocated to the government agency whose
records are requested. 28 Additionally, FOIA provides for the assess-
ment of reasonable attorney fees and costs against the United States
where a plaintiff has "substantially prevailed."29 The district courts
sufficient safeguards for protecting vital defense information and other sensitive data which might
in some way be detrimental to the Government or individuals if improperly released." 112 CONG.
REC. 13,657 (1966). She also expressed her belief that FOIA would "establish a much-needed
uniform policy of disclosure without impinging upon the rights of any citizen." Id.
24. See Fein, supra note 2, at 805-12 (discussing the historical roots of executive secrecy and
the importance of protecting national policy interests); see also Judith A. Bigelow, Meeting the
Agency Burden Under the Confidential Source Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, 60
WASH. L. REV. 873 (1985) (pointing out that FOIA recognizes the need to encourage individuals
to volunteer information to law enforcement agencies by protecting their identities); Bruce M.
Stevens, Comment, Military Aviation Mishaps: The Right to Know under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act v. The Need for Safety Privilege, 16 W. ST. U. L. REV. 287, 293 (1988) (examining
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 802 (1984)
which held that where confidentiality is required to ensure efficient governmental operations, privi-
lege should exist). During the House debate, Congressman Dole pointed out that
this bill gives full recognition to the fact that the President must at times act in secret
in the exercise of his constitutional duties when it exempts from availability to the
public matters that are specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in
the interest of national defense or foreign policy.
112 Cong. Rec. 13,655 (1966).
25. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 151 (1989) (citing Department of Air
Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
27. Id.
28. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 13, at 9, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2426 (explaining that the burden of proof is placed on the agency as "the only party able to
justify the withholding" when a private citizen "cannot be asked to prove that an agency has
withheld information improperly because he will not know the reasons for the agency action");
John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. 146 (noting the statute's placement of the burden to sustain its action
upon the agency).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). A requester has a right to appeal if the administrative appeal is
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may cause disciplinary proceedings to be initiated against "agency
personnel [who] acted arbitrarily or capriciously" in withholding in-
formation.30 After proceedings are conducted by special counsel,
FOIA expressly instructs agency authorities to "take the corrective
action" recommended. 3 Finally, FOIA provides for the district
courts to hold agency employees who fail to comply with an order in
contempt of court. a2 The expansive nature of judicial authority
under FOIA underscores the legislative intent to promote disclosure.
B. FOIA Exemptions and Requesting Procedures
Notwithstanding the clear prodisclosure spirit of FOIA, govern-
ment agencies may deny requests under the statutory exemptions
created under subsection (b). FOIA identifies the following nine ex-
empt categories:
(b)(1) documents authorized to be "kept secret" by Executive-
Order"' in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and
properly classified as such;34
(b)(2) documents related "solely" to internal agency personnel
rules and practices;3 5
(b)(3) documents exempted from disclosure by other statutes as
long as the statute either leaves no discretion to the agency, or es-
tablishes "particular criteria" for withholding or describes "particu-
denied. The requester can file an appeal in district court where the requester lives, where the
documents are located, or in the District of Columbia. If the requester goes to court, the burden of
justifying the withholding of documents is on the government. FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra
note 15, at 3-23.
30. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 552(a)(4)(G).
33. An executive order is issued by the president or an administrative authority under presiden-
tial direction for the purpose of "interpreting, implementing, or giving administrative effect to a
provision of the Constitution or of some law or treaty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 569 (6th ed.
1990). An executive order is published in the Federal Register, which gives it the effect of law. Id.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1); see Abbotts v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 766 F.2d 604, 606
(D.C. Cir. 1985). In Abbotts, the plaintiff sought disclosure of information regarding security
procedures at nuclear energy plants, which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission withheld under
exemption (b)(I). Id. This provision protects from disclosure matters that are "specifically author-
ized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy ...." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A). The court held that the information
was properly withheld as confidential under the executive order and properly classified as such
where its disclosure could allow an adversary to more effectively plan. an attack on a nuclear
facility. Abbots, 766 F.2d at 608.
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2); see Davis, supra note 14, at 785 (explaining several Senate commit-
tee examples of exemption (b)(2) materials such as employee parking, lunch hour, and sick leave
regulations).
800
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lar types of matters" to be withheld;36
(b)(4) information classified as "trade secrets and commercial or
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential"; 37
(b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters "which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency"; 38
(b)(6) personnel, medical, and similar files, "the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy"; 39
(b)(7) records compiled for law enforcement purposes, "but only
to the extent that the production of such . . . records . . . could
reasonably be expected to" (A) interfere with enforcement proceed-
ings; (B) deprive a person of the right to a fair trial; (C) constitute
an unwarranted invasion of privacy; (D) disclose the identity of a
confidential source; (E) disclose "techniques and procedures for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could
reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law"; or (F)
endanger the life or physical safety of an individual;40
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); see Winchester & Zirkle, supra note 20, at 250-51 (citing exemption
(b)(3) and identifying the National Security Act of 1947 and section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949 as
examples of other statutes exempting materials from disclosure).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4); see Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding
that the three statutory requirements under exemption (b)(4): (I) trade secrets and commercial or
financial information (2) obtained from a person (3) that is privileged or confidential, were not
satisfied by "a bare list of names and addresses of employees which employers are required by law
to give the board, without any express promise of confidentiality and which cannot be fairly char-
acterized as 'trade secrets' or 'financial' or 'commercial' information").
38. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). Exemption (b)(5) has provided a particularly fertile source of litiga-
tion. One author calls (b)(5) "FOIA's most controversial and farthest reaching exemption."
Miles, supra note 17, at 1329. She explains that although Congress intended that disclosure of
documents ordinarily obtainable through civil discovery be permitted under (b)(5), the statutory
language provides only a "rough guide" as to what is not considered disclosable. Id. (citing
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 858 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
Supreme Court opinions have held (b)(5) to protect attorney work product and attorney-client
privilege as well as the "deliberative process privilege." Id. (citing NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975)).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). In Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court
disallowed an agency's (b)(6) withholding where the information requester asked for a list of
agency employees to conduct a telephone survey. The court held that the invasion of privacy that
would result from loss of anonymity and a telephone call "should be characterized as relatively
minor" and that any further disclosure by the employees would be consensual. Getman, 450 F.2d
at 675.
40. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). Because of its breadth, exemption (b)(7) has also generated a signifi-
cant amount of litigation. One scholar predicted problems in interpreting this exemption
"stem[ming] from the fact that investigations are often for multiple purposes, for purposes that
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(b)(8) information contained in or relative to "examination, oper-
ating or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of
an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial
institutions"; 41
(b)(9) geological and geophysical data and maps "concerning
wells."42
Generally, these exemptions reflect the intent of Congress to pro-
tect matters touching on national security, law enforcement investi-
gations, and information related solely to the internal workings of
government agencies s.4  Disclosure of information that would consti-
tute an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of another is proscribed,
and protection is given to certain trade secrets and financial institu-
change as the investigations proceed, and for purposes that are never clarified." Davis, supra note
14, at 800. A diverse array of documents has been held to fall within the scope of (b)(7). The
United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of unwarranted invasion of privacy in United
States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989),
wherein an FBI "rap sheet" was held to fall within the scope of exemption (b)(7)(C). See also
King v. United States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that where
the government maintained a file on the plaintiff's mother-in-law because it believed that she was
involved in criminal activities, documents requested by the plaintiff as research for a biography
were properly withheld under (b)(7)); United Technologies Corp. v. NLRB, 777 F.2d 90, 93 (2d
Cir. 1985) (upholding a "confidential source" withholding under (b)(7) where an employee of the
plaintiff provided the government with documents obtained without the plaintiff's permission,
thereby acquiring a justified expectation of confidentiality); Stein v. Department of Justice, 662
F.2d 1245, 1260 (7th Cir. 1981) (allowing a (b)(7) withholding on the grounds that portions of
the requested information contained names and other identifying data of FBI agents, informants,
and others peripherally involved in intelligence operations, even though the plaintiff was request-
ing his own FBI records). See generally Richard A. Kaba, Threshold Requirements for the FBI
under Exemption 7 of the Freedom of Information Act, 86 MICH. L. REV. 620 (1987) (discussing
the history of exemption (b)(7)). The 1966 version of (b)(7) provided for a "no further inquiry
rule" if a file was compiled for law enforcement purposes. Id. at 625-26. In 1974, the exemption
was amended to allow nondisclosure only if disclosure would result in specific statutory harms,
thus significantly narrowing its scope. Id. The 1986 version currently in force permits nondisclo-
sure only if disclosure would lead to one of the six harms listed under (b)(7)(A) through (b)(7)(F)
or if such harms could reasonably be expected to occur. Id. at 628. Accordingly, the current test
to determine the applicability of the exemption involves two prongs. First, the files must have been
compiled for law enforcement purposes, and second, disclosure must lead or reasonably be ex-
pected to lead to one of the enumerated harms. Id. at 630.
41. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8). Legislative history indicates that exemption (b)(8) seeks to protect
financial institutions "for the sensitive details collected by Government agencies which regulate
these institutions could, if indiscriminately disclosed, cause great harm." H.R. REP. No. 1497,
supra note 13, at 11, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2428.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(9). Exemption (b)(9) was created when legislators learned that this kind
of information was not otherwise protected by "trade secret" laws. Since oil companies must file
details about oil and gas discovery with the federal government, disclosure would unfairly favor
speculators. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 13, at I1, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2428-
29.
43. 112 CONG. REC. 13,645 (1966) (statement of Congressman King of Utah).
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tion administrative matters." However, under FOIA, unless the in-
formation sought falls squarely within the scope of one of the nine
exemptions, the presumption always favors the right of public
access.
45
When seeking disclosure of information under FOIA, an individ-
ual must obtain and adhere to published procedural requirements
established by the particular agency involved.4 6 Additionally, the
records sought must be described with reasonable particularity.47
Upon receipt of a request, the agency has ten days to make an ini-
tial determination as to whether the information will be disclosed
and to notify the requesting party of its decision.48 When an agency
determines that the information falls within the scope of one or
more of FOIA's exemptions and issues a denial, the requesting party
must be given the names and titles of those agency employees re-
sponsible for the action. The requesting party must also be informed
of the right to appeal' to the agency head. 49 The agency has twenty
days to consider the appeal. If the denial is confirmed as to any
portion of the requested information, the agency must advise the
requesting party of the right to seek judicial review.5 0
As provided by FOIA, a requesting party may challenge an
agency's classification of material as exempted by filing a complaint
in federal district court. As explained above, the district court con-
ducts a de novo review and may examine the withheld records in
camera to determine the propriety of the claimed exemptions.5" Al-
though Congress intended the review process to expedite actions and
safeguard against improper withholding instead of "add[ing] sub-
stantially to crowded court dockets, ' 52 the following discussion indi-
cates how the courts have nonetheless been burdened with reviews
comprising voluminous documentation.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3); see Michael P. Cox, A Walk Through Section 552 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act; The Freedom of Information Act; The Privacy Act; and the Government in
the Sunshine Act, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 969, 971 (1978) (stating that the requester must describe
the records as precisely as possible in accordance with the agency's published rules and
regulations).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3).
48. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B); see also supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
52. HR. REP. No. 1497, supra note 13, at 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2426.
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FOIA provides for the filing of complaints in the jurisdiction
where the complainant resides or has a principal place of business,
the jurisdiction in which the agency records are located, or in the
District of Columbia. 3 A significant amount of FOIA litigation
takes place in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. 54 As a result, the D.C. Circuit has had ample opportu-
nity to experience the drain on a court's resources caused by exten-
sive in camera reviews.
In 1973, the D.C. Circuit addressed the problems that arise when
agencies submit inadequate justification for nondisclosure. In
Vaughn v. Rosen, the court took the opportunity to send an unam-
biguous message to agencies that broad claims of exemptions set
forth in conclusory affidavits would no longer be acceptable.55
In Vaughn, a law professor filed a FOIA request seeking disclos-
ure of United States Civil Service Commission (Commission) re-
ports generated by the Bureau of Personnel Management (Bu-
reau).56 The Bureau denied the request, and the director of the Civil
Service Commission sustained the denial. 57 As justification, the
Commission claimed FOIA exemptions under sections (b)(2) (inter-
nal agency rules and practices), (b)(5) (inter-agency or intra-agency
memoranda), and (b)(6) (personnel or medical files).58 When the
plaintiff challenged the exemptions, the director of the Bureau of
Personnel Management submitted an affidavit which merely identi-
fied the pertinent exceptions and asserted that the requested materi-
als fell within their scope59. The agency filed a motion to dismiss, or
alternatively, for summary judgment. The district court granted the
government's motion and the plaintiff appealed.60
The circuit court's analysis of the government's affidavit noted
that it failed to "illuminate or reveal the contents of the information
sought, but rather set forth in conclusory terms the Director's opin-
ion that the evaluations were not subject to disclosure under the
53. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
54. Miles, supra note 17, at 1326.
55. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
56. Id. at 821-22.
57. Id. at 822.
58. Id. at 821-22.
59. Id. at 823.
60. Id.
[Vol. 42:795
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FOIA."6 1 In criticizing the government's response, the court empha-
sized the purpose of FOIA, which represented "an effort to permit
access by the citizenry to most forms of government records," and
warned that FOIA exemptions must be construed narrowly in order
to provide maximum access in conformity with the overall purpose
of the Act. 2 The court stressed that the burden of proof is on the
declining agency and that the court would review the request de
novo. 3 It reasoned that FOIA's allocation of the burden of proof
addressed the "anomaly" created by its prodisclosure emphasis on
the one hand, and the "inevitable" fact that "the party with the
greatest interest in obtaining disclosure is at a loss to argue with
desirable legal precision for the revelation of the concealed informa-
tion" on the other.64
The court explained that the requesting party's lack of knowledge
resulted in a distortion of the traditional legal system's form of dis-
pute resolution, wherein the relevant facts are ordinarily more or
less equally available to both sides.6 5 As a result, the trier of fact
must assume the responsibility of conducting an in camera review to
determine whether the information has been properly exempted, an
often burdensome process.66 However, the court found this solution
flawed in that it deemed unreasonable the expectation that "a trial
judge . . . do . . .as thorough a job of illumination and characteri-
zation as would a party interested in the case."67 The court noted
that this problem was compounded at the appellate level, where the
additional burden of reviewing the lower court's determination of
the factual nature of the information accrued. This "investment of
judicial energy" was, in the court's estimation, neither justified nor
permissible where "the burden ha[d] been placed specifically by
statute on the government."6 8
The court criticized "the present method of resolving FOIA dis-
putes" on the grounds that it encouraged the government to "con-
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 824.
66. Id. at 825. The court concluded that the withheld documents consisted of many hundreds of
pages. A review of the trial court's determination that the claimed exemptions applied would
involve "committing sufficient resources to the project, but the cost in terms of judicial manpower
would be immense." Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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tend that large masses of information are exempt, when in fact part
of the information should be disclosed."6 9 Two factors identified by
the court supported this conclusion. First, it found that the govern-
ment had no incentive to disclose information because it had little to
lose by refusal and little to gain by disclosure. 0 Second, the fact
that the burden of review fell on the court created an "innate impe-
tus" which encouraged agencies to claim the broadest possible ex-
emptions and to "let the court decide."'7 Rejecting this unsatisfac-
tory result, the court pointed out the need to formulate a process
that would protect a party's right to obtain information and permit
efficient judicial review.72
The court then outlined a process that would meet these goals. 73
The new system created by the Vaughn court consisted of an index-
ing requirement that would oblige an agency to "correlate state-
ments made in [its] refusal justification with the actual portions of
the document. ' 74 The purpose of such an index would be to enable
the reviewing court to decide which portions of a document could be
disclosed and which could not by cross-referencing sections of a
given document to the corresponding parts of the government's justi-
fication affidavit. This would allow opposing counsel to eliminate un-
controverted portions of a document and narrow the scope of judi-
cial inquiry. 75 Although the court reserved the discretionary right to
appoint a special master to assist in reviewing documents, it believed
that the index system would improve the adversary testing process
and relieve the trial judge of much of the burden.76
69. Id. at 826.
70. The court noted:
At most ... [government agencies would] be put to a court test stacked in their
favor, the burden of which can be easily shifted to another by simply averring that the
information falls under one of several unfortunately imprecise exemptions. Con-
versely, there is little to be gained by making the disclosure. Indeed, from a bureau-
cratic standpoint, a general policy of revelation could cause positive harm, since it
could bring to light information detrimental to the agency and set a precedent for
future demands for disclosure.
Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. Specifically, the court envisioned a system that would "(1) assure that a party's right to
information is not submerged beneath governmental obfuscation and mischaracterization, and (2)
permit the court system effectively and efficiently to evaluate the factual nature of disputed infor-
mation." Id.
73. Id. at 826-27.
74. Id. at 827.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 828. "A sincere policy of maximum disclosure would truncate many of the disputes
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In conclusion, the court expressed the hope that the Vaughn deci-
sion might "sharply stimulate .. .agencies voluntarily to disclose
as much information as possible and to create internal procedures
that will assure that disclosable information can be easily separated
from that which is exempt."77 The adoption of what the court
termed a "sincere policy of maximum disclosure" would eliminate
many disputes and properly allocate the burden for those coming
before the courts. 78 The opinion emphasized the fact that FOIA was
designed to allow public access to most forms of government records
unless an exemption properly applied.79 In turn, the court believed
that the exemptions must be narrowly construed to provide maxi-
mum disclosure pursuant to the overall purpose of the Act.8 °
Thus, the D.C. Circuit gave birth to the "Vaughn index" with the
dual goals of decreasing and streamlining FOIA litigation. The
Vaughn mandate has resulted in the incorporation of the Vaughn
index in FOIA review, but it has fallen short of the maximum dis-
closure envisioned by the court.
D. The Vaughn Index Applied
After the Vaughn decision, the D.C. Circuit and others had am-
ple occasion to apply the new standards with a variety of results.
Federal appellate courts across the country have examined agency
affidavits using the Vaughn index to gauge their sufficiency.81 The
that are considered by [the] court." Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The court commented that, if forced to shoulder the burden, the government might
devote its "administrative ingenuity" to "lightening the load." Id. As an example of such ingenu-
ity, the court described the procedures adopted by investigative agencies to comply with disclosure
provisions of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970). Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 828 n.23. In order to
meet the Act's requirement of disclosure of information about witness testimony in criminal trials,
the agencies organized their files in such a way as to allow prompt removal of those portions
disclosable to defense counsel, while segregating the remaining portions. Id.
79. Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 828 n.23.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Silets v. United States Dep't of Justice, 945 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(holding that in camera review is not required where a Vaughn index sufficiently describes the
documents and justifies the claimed exemptions), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2991 (1992); Johnson v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 739 F.2d 1514, 1517 (10th Cir. 1984) (upholding the FBI's
claimed exemptions where the affidavits submitted consisted of "detailed declaration[s] specifying
how the agency characterized each bit of undisclosed information and the exemptions upon which
it relied"); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 644 F.2d 969, 972 (3d Cir. 1981)
(describing the Vaughn index as a "procedural tool ... to enable a district court to evaluate
allegations of exemption advanced by a governmental agency, and to assure that claimed exemp-
tions are justified under [FOIA]" and remanding the case for consideration of a revised Vaughn
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
varying degrees of stringency upon which the courts have insisted
and assessments of the adequacy of Vaughn indices highlight the
need for further judicial parameters.
1. The D.C. Circuit - Adherence to the Vaughn Precedent in Its
Home Circuit
Although the Vaughn court expressed optimism with regard to
future implementation of its standards, a uniform response was not
forthcoming. A representative sampling of D.C. Circuit FOIA cases
illustrates the absence of consistent agency response to Vaughn in-
dex requirements.
The Vaughn court stressed the importance of the adversary test-
ing process as a primary function of the index. A properly indexed
justification would allow the requesting party to argue against the
agency's claim of exemption.82 Mead Data Central v. United States
Department of the Air Force provides an example of a Vaughn in-
dex that was found sufficiently detailed to accomplish this purpose.83
In Mead Data Central, the plaintiff company sought disclosure of
information regarding a licensing agreement between the Air Force
and a legal publisher for the use of copyrighted material.84 The cir-
cuit court examined affidavits submitted by the Air Force as justifi-
cation for a section (b)(5) exemption (inter-agency or intra-agency
memoranda) in response to the request.85 The court found the with-
held documents properly indexed with clear descriptions of source,
subject matter, and corresponding justifications for exemption. 6 In
fact, the court favorably contrasted the Air Force affidavits with the
"broad, sweeping generalized claims. . . covering voluminous infor-
mation" that provoked the Vaughn remand."
index fully explaining all claimed exemptions); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 471 (1st Cir. 1979)
(rejecting an affidavit purporting to support a (b)(7) law enforcement purposes exemption where
the requesting party sought the contents of his own FBI files and describing the declarations
contained in the FBI's affidavit as "self-serving" and as failing to "illustrate even an ephemeral
possibility of enforcement of federal laws"); see also Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425
U.S. 352 (1976). In Rose, a New York University law student made the FOIA request as part of
his research for a law review article. Id. at 354-55. The court refused to grant a blanket exemp-
tion for case summaries corresponding to Air Force ethics hearings under exemption (b)(2) for
internal rules and practices of an agency. Id. at 369.
82. Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 828.
83. 566 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
84. Id. at 248.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 252.
87. Id. at 251-52. The court commented that in contrast to the hundreds of pages at issue in
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The Vaughn court also addressed the need to narrowly construe
FOIA exemptions." Focusing on narrow construction in Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Justice,89 the circuit court re-
fused to allow an agency to broaden the section (b)(5) exemption to
include more material than actually fell within its scope.90 Playboy
Enterprises sought disclosure of an FBI report prepared by the
agency's internal Office of Professional Responsibility pertaining to
an informant alleged to have committed crimes during the period of
his undercover activities with the Ku Klux Klan.9 The FBI con-
tended that the entire report was protected by the internal agency
memoranda exemption. 92 Although the complete report was not re-
viewed, the district court refused to protect the document in its en-
tirety.93 After selecting certain data for deletion, the district court
instructed the FBI to disclose the remainder of the report.94 In re-
viewing the FBI's appeal, the circuit court focused on the "delibera-
tive process" portion of the exemption, which protects documents
containing advice, recommendations, and conclusions forming part
of an agency's decisionmaking process.95 The court emphasized that
only those portions of a document actually containing advice, con-
clusions, and recommendations may be exempted under the deliber-
ative process privilege, while purely factual material must be dis-
closed. The court refused to accept the FBI's argument that facts
chosen by a report's author reflect the " 'choice, weighing and anal-
ysis' " that result in their inclusion. 96 Although the court ultimately
ordered the district court to modify the scope of the disclosure or-
der, the opinion emphasized Vaughn's goal of separating disclosablie
from protected materials.97
Vaughn, the material requested here consisted of less than thirty pages and that the index de-
scribed the nature of the documents with sufficient clarity to enable the requesting party to argue
against the exemption claims. Id.
88. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
89. 677 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
90. Id. at 935.
91. Id. at 933.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 934.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 935. Similarly, in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975), the
Court explained congressional intent with regard to protection of the deliberative processes leading
to agency policy formulation and governmental decisions.
96. Playboy Enters., 677 F.2d at 935 (citing Brief for Appellant at 25, Playboy Enters. (No.
81-1605)).
97. Id.
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The Vaughn court also sought to remedy the lack of detail in
agency justifications. 98 In accord with the Vaughn index require-
ments, the circuit court flatly rejected an agency's attempt to avoid
providing a detailed affidavit in King v. United States Department
of Justice.9 There, the FBI denied King's request for her deceased
mother-in-law's file, relying on the section (b)(1) exemption for se-
cret materials pursuant to an executive order and a section (b)(7)
law enforcement purposes exemption.' 00 Instead of producing a
Vaughn index conforming to the court's mandate, the agency sub-
mitted copies of released documents with a code system denoting
deletions.' The court succinctly described the proffered code sys-
tem as, "in a word, inadequate" and reiterated the Vaughn
requirements.102
These decisions suggest that even in the jurisdiction of its origin,
agencies' understandings of the proper nature and extent of a
Vaughn index vary significantly. While some agencies have chosen
to respond in the spirit encouraged by the Vaughn court, others
have minimized, modified, or even substantially ignored the Vaughn
index requirements.
2. The Ninth Circuit - Understanding and Following Vaughn in
the Pre-Wiener Years
In the years between the announcement of the Vaughn rule and
the hearing of the Wiener case, the Ninth Circuit also adopted the
Vaughn index for FOIA review. Several decisions preceding Wiener
indicate how the circuit construed the requirements of Vaughn
within the framework of its own prior FOIA decisions.
98. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826, (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
The court remarked that lack of adequate justification was "the most obvious and the most easily
remedied flaw in current procedures." Id.
99. 830 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
100. Id. at 212.
101. Id. at 219-20. The court described the code system in which each withheld portion of a
document was marked with a four-character code. Id. The first two characters identified the ex-
emption, such as (b)(1), authorizing withholding pursuant to executive order; the third referred to
the category of the executive order under which an exemption was construed; and the last charac-
ter cross-referenced deletions to statements contained in a "code-catalogue" provided by the
agency. Id.
102. Id. at 223-24. The court remarked that if Vaughn had failed to explicitly require a with-
holding agency to describe each withheld document and discuss the consequences envisioned from
its disclosure, "[the] requirement . . . [was] unmistakably implicit in the principles supporting
[the] decision in that case, as . . . [the court's] subsequent decisions have made very clear." Id. at
224.
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In Binion v. United States Department of Justice,' the court
considered a dispute involving section (b)(5) and section (b)(7) ex-
emptions for deliberative process and law enforcement purposes, re-
spectively. °4 Binion requested his FBI file contents, which included
communications between that agency and the United States pardon
attorney, as well as investigative information.'0 5 The court held that
the affidavit submitted for the deliberative process exemption com-
plied with Vaughn and could not be more specific without "re-
veal[ing] that which the agency wishes to conceal."'10 6 The court
noted that the legal sufficiency of the agency affidavit was a ques-
tion of law and that since the degree of detail was sufficient and no
factual information was severable, Vaughn standards had been
met. '7 With regard to the law enforcement records claim, the court
reiterated a standard articulated three years earlier, requiring that a
law enforcement agency establish only a " 'rational nexus' " be-
tween its enforcement duties and the withheld document. 08 The
court determined that information compiled by the FBI in the
course of investigating Binion's application for presidential pardon
of a tax offense satisfied the rational nexus test.10 9 Having found
this rational nexus to exist, the court noted that requiring the FBI to
reveal the confidential sources involved in pardon investigations
would deter citizens from future cooperation. 10 In turn, the lack of
cooperation would interfere with the flow of information on which
the president must rely in making a decision to grant or deny a
pardon."'
103. 695 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1983).
104. Id. at 1193.
105. Id. at 1190.
106. Id. at 1193.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1194 (quoting Church of Scientology v. United States Dep't of the Army, 611 F.2d
738, 748 (9th Cir. 1979)).
109. Il. It is useful to recall that the current statutory test for determining whether a file is
properly exempted under the law enforcement purposes exemption involves two prongs. See 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1988). The file must have been compiled for law enforcement purposes and
disclosure must lead, or be reasonably expected to lead, to one of six statutory harms. Id. How-
ever, while FOIA provides explicit guidelines for the second prong, the statute does not define the
term "law enforcement purposes." Binion, 695 F.2d at 1194. The Binion court noted that the
Ninth Circuit developed its own standard in Church of Scientology holding that "an agency with
a clear law enforcement mandate . . . need establish only a 'rational nexus' between its law en-
forcement duties and the document for which Exemption 7 is claimed." Id. (citing Church of
Scientology v. United States Dep't of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 1979)).
110. Binion, 695 F.2d at 1194.
11. Id. at 1194. Exemption (b)(7)(D) is one of the six statutory harms from which law en-
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Shortly after Binion, the Ninth Circuit heard Doyle v. FBI, an-
other case involving an individual's request for his own file. 112 In
Doyle, the District Court for the Southern District of California
found public affidavits submitted by the FBI overly vague and con-
clusory. 1 3 When Doyle filed a motion for in camera inspection, the
FBI submitted in camera affidavits.11 The district court granted the
agency's motion for summary judgment based on these affidavits. 5
On appeal, the circuit court reiterated Vaughn's rejection of "con-
clusory and generalized allegations" as justification for exemp-
tions." 6 However, the court again acknowledged that the govern-
ment need not provide so much detail as to compromise the secrecy
of the information.1 1 7 Accordingly, the in camera affidavits met
Vaughn index standards and the district court's ruling was
affirmed. 8
In National Wildlife Federation v. United States Forest Ser-
vice," 9 the circuit court considered a withholding under the section
(b)(5) deliberative process exemption. 2 0 In response to the plain-
tiff's FOIA request, the Forest Service claimed that working drafts
pertaining to a national forest plan were exempt as part of the
agency's decisionmaking process. 2' The court interpreted Vaughn
and similar cases to suggest that in order to qualify for the section
(b)(5) deliberative process exemption, documents must form part of
the agency give-and-take upon which ultimate decisions rely, includ-
ing recommendations, opinions, proposals, and suggestions. 2 How-
ever, it concluded that the documents need not actually contain law
or policy recommendations in order to qualify for the exemption. 23
Instead, the court found that factual material forming part of dis-
puted documents must be analyzed to determine the extent to which
forcement records are protected (i.e., the disclosure of a confidential source). See 5 U.S.C. §
552(b).
112. 722 F.2d 554, 555 (9th Cir. 1983).
113. Id. at 556-57.
114. Id. at 555.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Church of Scientology v. United States Dep't of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 742
(9th Cir. 1979)).
117. Id. at 556.
118. Id. at 555-57.
119. 861 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1988).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1115.
122. Id. at 1118-19.
123. Id. at 1118.
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it is inextricably intertwined with the process of policy formula-
tion.12 Facts fourid to be "process-oriented" would be properly ex-
empted. 125 After reviewing the documents at issue, the court found
that they formed part of the predecisional process and therefore fell
within the scope of the claimed exemption.2 6
Generally, the pre-Wiener opinions of the Ninth Circuit reveal a
patient, tolerant approach to FOIA litigation. The cases reflect what
appears to be a sincere effort to comply with the letter and spirit of
FOIA, while still allowing proper degrees of latitude and deference
to government agencies. The circuit court adopted the Vaughn re-
quirements but did not appear to curtail its own careful construction
of FOIA provisions, nor did it exhibit a tendency to quickly reject
the Vaughn index as inadequate. Against this background of toler-
ance, the stern flavor of the Wiener opinion stands out in sharp
contrast.
II. WIENER V. FBI 127: THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S STRICTER
REQUIREMENTS AND CLEARER MANDATE
I'm a representative of the human race. I'm speaking for us all.
128
-John Lennon
A. Facts
Jonathan M. Wiener is a Professor of History at the University of
California at Irvine.'29 In 1981, during the course of his research for
a book about the late ex-Beatle John Lennon, he filed FOIA re-
quests with the FBI. °30 Wiener sought disclosure of agency records
pertaining to an investigation of Lennon conducted during the late
1960s and early 1970s.' 3 ' Wiener requested information from four
124. Id. at 1119.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1123 (denying the plaintiff access to the Forest Service's internal documents).
127. 943 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992).
128. JON WIENER, COME TOGETHER: JOHN LENNON IN His TIME 95 (University of Ill. Press
1991) (1984).
129. Appellant's Opening Brief at 4, Wiener v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1991) (No. 88-
5867). The appellant's brief provides Professor Wiener's biographical history. He is a graduate of
Princeton and Harvard Universities and has lectured extensively. Id. at 4 n.l. Professor Wiener is
the author of two books, including the Lennon book, as well as 18 published articles. Id.
130. Wiener v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992).
131. Id. at 977. The court mentioned that Wiener wanted this information in order to support
his theory that the FBI investigation of Lennon illustrated how executive agencies were utilized to
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FBI offices. 132 The FBI disclosed portions of the information but
withheld the remainder, citing FOIA exemptions. 33 Although Wie-
ner filed internal agency appeals, the initial decisions were generally
affirmed."3
In 1983, Wiener filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California seeking injunctive relief
against the FBI as provided by statute. 13 5 Wiener also filed a motion
to compel the FBI to prepare an adequate Vaughn index. 13 The
FBI responded by producing the affidavits of two agents in support
of the claimed exemptions, along with a brief in opposition to Wie-
ner's motion. 13 7 The district court ordered in camera production of
further justification explaining each exemption in detail.' 38 In re-
sponse, the agency provided additional declarations from the two
FBI agents, as well as an affidavit from a CIA agent. 3 9 After coun-
sel for Wiener moved for an order mandating disclosure of the in
camera documents or, alternatively, preparation of a new Vaughn
suppress political dissent. See also WIENER, supra note 128, at xv-xvi. Wiener commented in his
book that rock music "could become a potent political force ... when . . . linked to real political
organizing." Id. at xvi. The book theorized that President Nixon feared that this potential force
could jeopardize his reelection in 1972. Id. at 285; see also Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, Wie-
ner (No. 88-5867). The brief notes that Wiener's research regarding Lennon formed part of "a
broader study of the political and social movements of the period and the changes they created."
Id.
132. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5. Wiener mailed letters to the Washington, New York,
Detroit, and Los Angeles offices. Id. at 6.
133. Id. at 5-6. The Washington office denied the bulk of Wiener's request, sending him a form
letter indicating three exemptions under which 199 pages were withheld. The New York office
withheld twenty-three pages pursuant to four exemptions. The Detroit office provided some docu-
ments with deletions but completely withheld others. The Los Angeles office initially withheld
records but subsequently released a limited portion. Id. at 6. Ultimately, the FBI relied on three
exemptions: (b)(1) - documents classified pursuant to Executive Order; (b)(3) - withholding
authorized by another statute; and (b)(7)(C) - documents related to law enforcement. Wiener,
943 F.2d at 977.
134. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5-6.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 6-7. The motion was filed following an exchange of correspondence in which Wiener
provided the FBI with a copy of the proposed motion, including his interpretation of what a proper
Vaughn index would contain. Id. The FBI responded with copies of agents' declarations and ex-
hibits "purporting to describe in accordance with Vaughn the materials withheld and the exemp-
tions from disclosure asserted." Id. at 7. Wiener sent the agency a letter describing his objections
to the FBI declarations and identifying the specific exemptions that he challenged. Id.
137. Id. at 7.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 7-8.
1992] AGENCY JUSTIFICATION OF FOIA EXEMPTIONS 815
index, the court ordered a briefing schedule to address the issues. 140
Subsequently, both sides submitted briefs, and two years passed. 4'
After a long wait, Wiener's attorneys wrote a letter to the district
court in an effort to determine whether a decision on the pending
motion would be forthcoming. 42 In 1987, the FBI moved for sum-
mary judgment. 43 In response, Wiener filed a cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment. After review, the court granted the FBI's motion,
holding that the "affidavits and declarations carr[ied] the govern-
ment's burden of proof to show that the FOIA exemptions were
properly applied.' 144 Wiener appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on three grounds: (1) that the FBI's
affidavits were inadequate; (2) that the district court erred (a) in
accepting the agency's broad explanations without demanding
greater specificity, and (b) in failing to review the documents to de-
termine the segregability of any disclosable information; and (3)
that the district court erred in granting summary judgment where
there remained triable issues of fact regarding the propriety of the
claimed exemptions. 45 The Ninth Circuit considered only the first
two issues set forth in Wiener's appeal. Since the court reversed and
remanded the case to the court below, there was no need to reach
the issue of summary judgment.
B. Holdings
A panel of three circuit judges held: (1) that the FBI's affidavits
were insufficient because they lacked detail and specificity and, they
failed to provide the requester with a basis on which to contest with-
holdings; 46 (2) that the district court erred in (a) failing to demon-
strate that a careful de novo review was conducted as required by
FOIA; (b) failing to demonstrate that the government's burden of
proof to show the propriety of the claimed exemptions had been
met; and (c) failing to make specific findings on the issue of
segregability.'
140. Id. at 8.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 9.
144. Id.
145. Wiener v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992).
146. Id. at 979.
147. Id. at 978-79.
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C. The Court's Application of Vaughn
1. The FBI's General Failure to Comply with Vaughn
Before proceeding to an in-depth analysis, the court criticized the
FBI's affidavits in general terms, characterizing the agency's re-
sponses as "boilerplate" language drawn from a " 'master' response"
routinely used to answer FOIA requests.1"8 The court remarked on
the FBI's obvious failure even to attempt to "tailor" the explana-
tions to the individual documents withheld. 149 For instance, John
Lennon's name did not appear on the agency's original Vaughn in-
dex.' The court stated that these explanations were precisely the
sort previously rejected by the D.C. Circuit as clearly "inade-
quate."15 The Vaughn index lacked specificity, and the FBI failed
to disclose all it could.152 The court admonished the FBI and re-
minded it that the Vaughn index was meant to assist the FOIA
process. 53
2. The Step-by-Step Critique
The court did not end its inquiry with these general criticisms of
the agency's failure to properly index. Instead, the court proceeded
to scrutinize each claimed exemption,15 4 to identify the shortcom-
ings of the Vaughn index justification,155 and to provide concrete
examples of how a proper response could have been framed. 5 ' The
court clearly stated that the issue before it was not whether the clas-
sifications were proper, nor was the court compelled to consider un-
derlying policy considerations for or against disclosure. Rather, the
issue to be decided by the Wiener court was simply whether the
148. Id. at 978.
149. Id. at 978-79.
150. Id. at 979.
151. Id. (citing King v. United States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
152. Id. The court noted that "[s]pecificity is the defining requirement of the Vaughn index."
Id. (quoting King v. United States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
153. Id.
The FBI must bear in mind that the purpose of the index is not merely to inform the
requester of the agency's conclusion that a particular document is exempt from dis-
closure under one or more of the statutory exemptions, but to afford the requester an
opportunity to intelligently advocate release of the withheld documents and to afford
the court an opportunity to intelligently judge the contest.
Id. at 979.
154. Id. at 979-88.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 987.
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plaintiff had been provided sufficient information to contest the clas-
sifications claimed by the government. 157 The methodology em-
ployed by the court to determine this paramount question reveals a
discernible test consisting of three prongs.
In each point-by-point analysis, the court first identified the
claimed exemption and defined its statutory scope and requirements
(nature and scope prong). 158 Next, the court opined how much in-
formation, at a minimum, would be necessary to allow Wiener to
intelligently contest the FBI's classification (minimum required in-
formation prong).159 Finally, from its standpoint of in camera priv-
ity to the actual contents of the documents, the court specifically
indicated which missing information, if any, could have been re-
vealed by the agency (exemplary information prong).16 If, however,
the court was satisfied with the information provided under the sec-
ond prong, the third prong was not invoked.16' Through this process,
the Wiener court demonstrated exactly how the Vaughn index
should be used in order to serve the purposes for which it was devel-
oped. In most of the instances where the court applied the test, the
FBI fell short of compliance.
a. Documents classified pursuant to executive order for national
security: Exemption (b)(1)
The FBI's first claim of exemption relied on an Executive Order
entitled "National Security Information," which was issued in 1982
by President Reagan. 6 ' In the first prong in which the nature and
scope of the exemption are noted, the court acknowledged that sub-
stantial weight should be given to an agency's decision to classify
documents. 63 However, the court emphasized that FOIA permits
challenges to those decisions subject to mandatory review by the dis-
trict court, where the burden of proof to sustain exemptions falls on
the government. 6
157. Id. at 980.
158. Id. at 979-88.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983) (prescribing a "uniform system for classify-
ing, declassifying, and safeguarding national security information" and providing that information
should "not be classified under [it] unless its disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause
damage to the national security").
163. Wiener. 943 F.2d at 980.
164. Id.
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The FBI based many of its national security withholdings on the
conclusion that release of information would damage national secur-
ity by leading to the disclosure of a confidential source.165 Certain
information had been classified by the agency pursuant to the Exec-
utive Order as "confidential source.116 6 In applying the minimum
required information prong, the court pointed out that notwithstand-
ing such classification, the agency must provide the requester with
enough information to determine whether the source was truly a
confidential one; why disclosure would lead to the source's exposure;
and how disclosure of the source could reasonably be expected to
cause damage to the national security, notwithstanding "confidential
source" classification.1 67 Instead, the FBI simply grouped eight cate-
gories of withheld information under the rubric of "confidential
source" and indicated generally that disclosure could harm the na-
tional security. 68
Moving on to the exemplary information prong, the court rejected
this broad assertion and identified six specific harms that the FBI
could have described: (1) termination of the source; (2) discontinua-
tion of the source's services; (3) exposure of other intelligence activi-
ties; (4) modification or cancellation of future intelligence activities;
(5) the risk that hostile entities could evaluate intelligence sources
directed against them, with the attendant risk of counter-measures;
and (6) the chilling effect on the overall "climate of cooperative-
ness" among intelligence sources unwilling to risk exposure. 169 The
court concluded that in order to satisfy the minimum information
requirement, not only should the FBI have enumerated these harms,
but the index should also have described withheld documents, iden-
tified what information contained therein would expose the confiden-
tial sources, and explained how disclosure could harm national
security.17 0
The FBI also withheld information pursuant to the Executive Or-
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 980 n.12. The categories listed by the FBI were: I) names and codenames; 2) infor-
mation which reveals the character or degree of source coverage or penetration; 3) detailed infor-
mation pertaining to or provided by an intelligence source; 4) dates furnished by an intelligence
source; 5) instructions for the dissemination of information; 6) the date or place of a contact
between a source and the government; 7) the identity of an intelligence source's government con-
tact; and 8) information about subsidiary investigations such as background checks. Id.
169. Id. at 980-81.
170. Id. at 981.
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der on the grounds that it concerned "intelligence activities ... or
•... methods,"'1 71 without identifying any specific harm that could
result from disclosure. The court offered succinct criticism of this
justification. It decided that the FBI's "generalized, theoretical dis-
cussion" was "simply too broad to be of any use to Wiener, the
district court or this court."' 172
A claimed exemption under the Executive Order for information
regarding "foreign relations or . . .activities"'' 73 received identical
treatment. The FBI asserted that disclosure would somehow lead to
military retaliation against the United States. 74  Here, the court
simply observed that no attempt was made by the FBI to show how
this claim of "seemingly far-fetched harms" had "any relevance" to
the withheld documents. 75
b. Withholding authorized by another statute: Exemption (b)(3)
The FBI relied on four statutes purporting to authorize withhold-
ing. The agency withheld records relating to visa applications, tax
returns, and CIA-related information. 76  The court analyzed each
one in turn.
i. Visa applications
In applying the nature and scope prong, the court noted that the
agency justified withholdings classified under "visa applications" by
citing federal immigration law.' 77 However, to support the conten-
171. Id. at 980 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983)).
172. Id. at 981. The affidavit corresponding to this claim actually identified several ways in
which harm to national security could theoretically result from disclosure of intelligence activities.
For example, the government listed the danger of revealing the existence of an intelligence opera-
tion and its particular scope or thrust, and the risk of revealing data used to acquire and process
intelligence information or the manner in which such data is acquired. Id. This could then lead to
the risk that hostile entities might be able to assess the government's intelligence collection capa-
bilities, thus compromising current and future operations. Id. However, the court found that these
explanations did not satisfactorily answer several questions which it posed (i.e., how and why a
twenty-year-old investigation could realistically be expected to compromise a current operation;
how the specific investigation of John Lennon could relate to current operations; and whether the
methods used to investigate John Lennon are still in use today, thus justifying the continued se-
crecy surrounding his investigation). Id. at 981 n. 15. Clearly, the answers to these questions would
be necessary to satisfy the minimum information standard used by the court. Id.
173. Id. at 982; see also Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983).
174. Wiener, 943 F.2d at 982.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 982-83.
177. Id. at 982. The FBI relied on 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f) (1988), which classifies visa application
records as "confidential." Wiener, 943 F.2d at 982.
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tion that requested information fell within the scope of the statute,
the FBI simply quoted language from the law. 178 On the minimum
required information prong, the court questioned how a requester
could challenge this determination without a description of the with-
held documents.17 9 Under the third prong, an exemplary illustration
of what sort of description would assist the requester, the court sug-
gested that the FBI could have indicated "that the withheld records
concerned a foreign citizen's request for a temporary waiver of cer-
tain visa requirements, and included the investigating official's rec-
ommended disposition of the request." 180 In this manner, the re-
quester would be apprised of the nature of the documents, but no
breach of confidentiality would result.' 8 '
ii. Tax returns
The FBI next turned to the Internal Revenue Code to justify a
claim of exemption for tax return information. 8 With regard to
nature and scope, the court remarked that the statutory definition of
tax return information was "long and complex" enough to allow
"reasonable people to differ as to its interpretation."' 83 Here again,
the requester must be given a description of the information suffi-
cient to allow a challenge to the agency's understanding of the stat-
ute. 8 " Ordinarily, the mere assertion that tax return information
was withheld will not suffice.' 85 However, in this instance, the court
determined that the exemption was properly claimed.' 86 Portions of
the document which had been previously released suggested the
identity of an individual whose privacy interests are protected by the
statute. 87 Therefore, disclosure of the exact nature of the tax return
information would compromise the confidentiality mandated by the
applicable statute.'88 Accordingly, the court concluded that the FBI
disclosed all that it could, satisfying the third prong analysis of how
178. Wiener, 943 F.2d at 982.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.; see 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1988) (regarding confidentiality and disclosure of returns and
return information).
183. Wiener, 943 F.2d at 982.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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much information can properly be revealed. 89
iii. CIA information
Finally, the FBI relied on two statutes pertaining to CIA informa-
tion to withhold certain documents.19 0 In its nature and scope analy-
sis, the court duly noted that both statutes specifically exempt infor-
mation from disclosure under FOIA.'91 To support the claimed
exemption, the agency submitted the affidavit of CIA Agent
Dube."9 2 The Dube affidavit provided sufficient information to jus-
tify all but one of the withholdings. 93
Two withholdings consisting of codenames fell within the scope of
a statutory exemption for the names of CIA agents. 94 Another
piece of withheld information revealed the location of a CIA instal-
lation abroad.' 95 The Dube affidavit sufficiently indicated how dis-
closure of the location of a foreign intelligence facility could lead to
the termination of the host nation's relationship with the CIA. 19 6
This information satisfied the minimum information prong and
eliminated the need to provide sample information on the third
prong. However, the affidavit failed to properly explain one deletion
which allegedly could lead to identification of a source. 97 The alle-
gation was unsupported by a discussion of the facts and reasoning
on which it was based, and therefore failed to provide Wiener with
the information necessary to challenge the conclusion. 98 In this in-
189. Id. at 983.
190. Id. at 985. These two statutes were the Civil Disobedience Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 231
(1988), and the Anti-Riot Act, 18 U.S.C. § 210 (1988). See also 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1988)
(making the director of the CIA responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure); 50 U.S.C. § 403(g) (1988) (exempting the CIA from the provisions of
other disclosure laws requiring the release of information regarding CIA personnel).
191. Wiener, 943 F.2d at 983.
192. Id. The court distinguished the Dube affidavit from the FBI's own affidavits in terms of
adequacy. Id. at 983 n.17.
193. Id. at 983.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. The court also noted that this exemption differs from the (b)(1) exemption in that an
agency relying on 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1988) need not show that disclosure will harm national
security. However, the Dube affidavit was detailed enough to serve as an adequate Vaughn index
for the (b)(1) exemption as well as for the (b)(3) claim because it indicated the nature of the
information to be the location of a CIA facility and that the-harm likely to result to the national
security from revealing the information was closure of the facility. Id. at 983 n.18.
197. Id. at 983.
198. Id. & n.19 (rejecting the Fifth Circuit's holding in Knight v. CIA, 872 F.2d 660 (5th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990), that a good faith determination by the CIA regarding
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stance, the court indicated that such facts and reasoning would be
necessary to meet the minimum information test, but failed to pro-
vide an example of the type of information that would suffice.
c. Records compiled for law enforcement purposes: Exemption
(b)(7)
The FBI also claimed section (b)(7) exemptions under the inva-
sion of privacy section and the identity of a confidential source
section. 199
i. Privacy
In analyzing the nature and scope of the privacy exemption, the
Wiener court turned to a Supreme Court holding that "a document
is properly withheld under Exemption [(b)(7)(c)] if the public inter-
est in disclosure is outweighed by the individual privacy interests
that would suffer from disclosure."200 Accordingly, the agency must
provide the requester with enough information to challenge the de-
termination that the balance favors nondisclosure.2 1 Using this
standard as the second prong for minimum information, the court
focused on two particular documents withheld pursuant to the
(b)(7)(C) privacy exemption.20 2 The court then turned to the third
prong by demonstrating how the agency could have given more
information.
With regard to the first document, the FBI could have revealed
that it contained reports gleaned from third-party informants re-
garding protest activities planned for the 1972 Republican National
Convention. 203 The document also discussed the possibility that Len-
non would organize fund-raising concerts.20 4 Had he received this
information, Wiener could have argued that no information beyond
the names of the individuals involved actually implicated privacy
concerns.
205
the withholding of a document is unreviewable and finding Knight inconsistent with FOIA's statu-
tory allocation of the burden of proof on the government).
199. Id. at 983-84, 986.
200. Id. at 984 (citing United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989)).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. The court was perplexed by the FBI's withholding of the information regarding Len-
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Without compromising privacy, the court stated that the FBI
could have described the second document as pertaining to meetings
among certain activists.20 6 The withheld information dealt with
"contests over the leadership" of the groups, reported on their per-
sonal hygiene habits, and mentioned "even the peculiar behaviors of
their pets."2 7 Lennon's name did not appear in the document until
the last paragraph, and then only to indicate that he would perform
at a benefit, provided that his appearance was not announced in ad-
vance.208 Instead of providing a description similar to the foregoing,
the FBI withheld the entire document on the ground that it related
to a third party.2"9 The court rejected the government's categorical
contention that an individual's privacy interest in his "rap sheet"
always outweighs the public's interest in disclosure.210 The court es-
chewed this "per se exempt[ion]" argument and held that ultimate
conclusions must be supported by a fact-specific balancing
process.211
The court also addressed the FBI's failure to specify precisely
what law enforcement purposes led to its investigation of Lennon.212
The agency cited two "broad criminal statutes, prohibiting a wide
variety of conduct" to explain why Lennon became the subject of an
investigation. 2 3 The court reasoned that, without more information
about the specific conduct of which Lennon was suspected, Wiener
would be hard pressed to argue that the claimed law enforcement
purposes might have been pretextual. 1 4
Interestingly, the court praised two justification statements that
Wiener did not appeal. The court found that they exemplified the
proper degree of Vaughn index specificity.2 15 In one instance, four
documents were withheld pursuant to the confidential source exemp-
non's concerts in view of the fact that the same information was previously disclosed in a cover
memo released to Wiener. Id. at 984 n.21.
206. Id. at 984.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 985.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 985-86.
214. Id. The court referred to an earlier decision requiring an agency to establish a " 'rational
nexus' between its law enforcement duties and the document for which Exemption 7 is claimed."
Id. at 985 (quoting Binion v. United States Dep't of Justice, 695 F.2d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir.
1983)).
215. Id. at 984 n.23.
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tion because they documented an investigation arising from a citi-
zen's complaint to his congressman about the famous nude photo-
graph of Lennon and Yoko Ono on an album cover. 16 The FBI
claimed that the release of these records could compromise the citi-
zen's privacy interests.217 This justification allowed Wiener the op-
portunity to argue that on balance, the citizen's privacy interest was
outweighed by other interests.2""
ii. Confidential source
Turning to the section (b)(7)(D) confidential source exemption,
the court criticized the FBI's failure to classify the "purported
grant" of confidentiality as express or implied.219 If the agency ex-
pressly granted confidentiality to an informant, such a promise
would be "virtually unassailable."220 If, however, the grant was
merely implied, the court would have to review the question as one
of fact. Under the court's test, the minimum information require-
ment would differ depending on whether confidentiality was express
or implied.2 ' Unless the grant was express, the purported informant
must have reasonably inferred a grant of confidentiality from the
specific circumstances, which would have to be explained in the affi-
davit.222 The FBI also failed to explain how it concluded that the,
informants would not have provided information absent an implied
grant of confidentiality. 223 The court concluded that the requester
must have this information in order to argue against the claimed
exemption, and that the district court must have sufficient facts to
inform a judgment on the merits.224
Once again, the court specified which facts and circumstances
could have been disclosed in order to properly inform the requester
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. The other example involved an FBI investigation of an individual alleged to have
threatened the Lennon family. The FBI reasoned that disclosure of the document's details would
lead to publicity of which the individual would probably become aware and which could conceiv-
ably cause him to resume his threatening behavior towards the Lennons or other celebrities. Id.
This reasoning was detailed enough to allow Wiener to controvert the argument had he chosen to
appeal that particular withholding. Id.
219. Id. at 986.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 986-87.
224. Id. at 987.
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and the court.2 2' The FBI could have revealed that in the course of
Lennon's deportation hearing, his attorney alleged that Lennon had
been offered a teaching position at New York University. 226 The
FBI corroborated this information by contacting an NYU official
who confirmed the offer.22 7 The court reasoned that the information
could have been revealed without naming the NYU official, thereby
protecting his identity as a source. 2 8
The repeated application of this three-prong analysis clearly dem-
onstrates the court's notion of how the FBI could have achieved a
satisfactory level of disclosure without revealing "that which the
agency wishes to conceal. 229
3. The district court's errors
The court below received sharp criticism. According to the appel-
late court, the lower court's findings amounted to no more than a
"list" of the government's affidavits and "the conclusory statement"
that the government had met its burden of proving proper applica-
tion of FOIA exemptions.230 The court held these findings insuffi-
cient to allow an appellate determination of which exemptions ap-
plied to each document and what "relevant, undisputed" facts
supported the nondisclosure. On remand, the district court was in-
structed to review "an adequate Vaughn index" and set forth de-
tailed reasons for each determination it might make.23'
The circuit judges characterized the district court's failure to rule
on the issue of segregability as reversible error.232 Reminding the
court below that FOIA compels that "[a]ny reasonably segregable
portion of a record shall be provided . . . after deletion of the por-
tions which are exempt ... ," the court ordered specific findings on
segregability.233
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. The tone of the court's opinion conveys a sense of perplexity at the FBI's unwillingness
to reveal what appears to be innocuous information.
229. Binion v. United States Dep't of Justice, 695 F.2d 1189, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
230. Wiener, 943 F.2d at 988.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. ("The court on remand must make a specific finding that no information contained in
each document or substantial portion of a document withheld is segregable.").
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D. Current Status - Wiener on Remand
The panel reversed and remanded the case, retaining jurisdiction
over all subsequent appeals.2" The FBI petitioned for rehearing en
banc, which was denied in December of 1991.1235 In June of 1992,
the United States Supreme Court denied the FBI's petition for a
writ of certiorari. 36 The case will now proceed on remand in the
district court, where the FBI will be obliged to produce a Vaughn
index that complies with the circuit court's specifications. If the dis-
trict court finds that the proffered justifications fail to meet the stat-
utory requirements, the FBI will be forced to disclose the disputed
information. In addition, Wiener may be eligible to receive fees and
costs under FOIA.23 7
III. ANALYSIS: FUTURE IMPLICATIONS AND UNANSWERED
QUESTIONS
The denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court vali-
dates the Wiener case and has the effect of closing the door on any
further delays in that particular matter. For the agency, this means
that a new Vaughn index will have to be prepared in strict accor-
dance with the road map provided by the Ninth Circuit. In a
broader sense, the effect of the Supreme Court's action will be to
compel similar Vaughn indices in future FOIA litigation in the
Ninth Circuit. The case may now serve as authority for other fed-
eral jurisdictions as well. After the hearing on remand, Wiener will
take its logical place as the next building block after Vaughn in the
realm of FOIA litigation.
234. Id. at 989.
235. See Wiener v. FBI, 951 F.2d 1073, 1073 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3013
(1992). There, the court rejected the FBI's contention that the Wiener decision conflicted with
Silets v. United States Department of Justice, 945 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 2991 (1992). Wiener, 951 F.2d at 1073. The Seventh Circuit held in Silets that in camera
review in FOIA litigation is discretionary and need not be performed where a Vaughn index is
adequate. Silets, 945 F.2d at 229; see also Wiener, 951 F.2d at 1073. In denying a rehearing, the
Wiener court noted that its opinion does not disagree with Silets precisely because the FBI's
Vaughn index was found inadequate. Id. In a telephone interview, Attorney Dan Marmalefsky,
co-counsel for the plaintiff, stated that he anticipated that if his petition for rehearing was denied,
the FBI would apply to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Telephone
Interview with Dan Marmalefsky, co-counsel for the plaintiff (Sept. 6, 1991). The FBI's subse-
quent petition for a writ has since been denied in FBI v. Wiener, 112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992).
236. FBI v. Wiener, 112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992).
237. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(e) (1988).
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A. Wiener Signals Tougher Standards for Ninth Circuit FOIA
Review
The Ninth Circuit's pre-Wiener opinions suggest a tolerant, mod-
erate approach to FOIA review.238 However, in Wiener, the court
took a hard line, applied a strict level of scrutiny, and refused to
accept weak justifications for withholding. This posture summarily
rejects government affidavits that wink at the requirements set forth
in Vaughn. The court emphasized that its function in reviewing a
Vaughn index is not to dispute the merits of the classification or to
challenge the applicability of an exemption.239 Instead, the court's
responsibility is to ensure that the index itself provides the informa-
tion necessary to allow the adversarial process to operate.2"" Unless
agencies are forced to supply an adequate Vaughn index, the court
will continue to shoulder the burden of sorting out reams of docu-
ments in camera. It was this burden that Vaughn sought to remedy,
as well as an effort to give effect to the intent of FOIA. Wiener
serves as a reminder to agencies that FOIA favors disclosure, that
the burden to justify a refusal to disclose rests with the government,
and that Vaughn established minimum standards for proper index-
ing of such justifications. This reminder takes the form of a detailed
analysis explaining what was wrong with the pre-Wiener status quo
and how it is to be corrected.
The court's criticism discernibly sharpened at each stage of its
analysis. At the first stage, the court conveyed disapproval in its
terse description of the FBI's Vaughn index. The index consisted of
"redacted copies of documents partially withheld and blacked out
copies of documents withheld in their entirety, with one or more
hand-written four digit codes .. . next to each withheld portion"
followed by the explanation "in general terms [of] why each cate-
gory of information should be withheld."'" The court clearly found
the agency's response, which barely paid lip-service to Vaughn and
FOIA requirements, to be wholly inadequate. This kind of justifica-
tion will no longer suffice. The opinion emphasized that the courts
must not accept any attempt by government agencies to foist the
task of meeting the burden of showing why information should not
238. See supra notes 103-26 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit's construc-
tion of the Vaughn index prior to the Wiener decision).
239. Wiener v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 978.
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be disclosed onto the judicial system. This was, after all, the essence
of Vaughn's holding.242
In setting forth its criticism of the way the justifications were sub-
mitted, the opinion called the FBI's explanations boilerplate and
pointed to the agency's use of the same master response to many
FOIA requests.24 The court referred to the agency's practice of
claiming several possible exemptions in the alternative as an "obvi-
ous obstacle to effective advocacy," one of the evils Vaughn sought
to rectify.244
Repeatedly, and at length, the court provided examples of pre-
cisely how the FBI could have properly complied with FOIA, leav-
ing an almost unavoidable inference that the agency simply did not
wish to cooperate, preferring instead to "let the court decide. '2 45
The FBI was dryly admonished to keep the Vaughn index's purpose
of promoting intelligent advocacy in mind on remand. 248 By making
the effort to provide such detailed examples in this one matter, the
court established standards that will oblige all agencies to make the
same effort in all subsequent cases.
Finally, the circuit court's treatment of the district court was only
slightly less harsh. The lower court's findings were deemed "con-
clusory. "247 A clear message was conveyed that on remand, nothing
less than sufficient detail will be acceptable.248 Although the
Vaughn court must have considered its own message unambiguous,
government agencies have continued to submit justifications rife
with inconsistency and indolence. Under Wiener, little doubt -re-
mains. The court's detailed examples flesh out Vaughn's basic
guidelines, leaving little or almost no question as to what constitutes
a proper justification for refusing to disclose information under a
FOIA exemption. An agency response which fails to meet the three-
prong test established by Wiener simply fails to comply with
Vaughn and with FOIA's purpose, and therefore is unacceptable. In
Wiener, one circuit has announced its rejection of deficient justifica-
242. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825-26 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977
(1974).
243. Wiener, 943 F.2d at 978-79.
244. Id. at 979.
245. Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 826.
246. Wiener, 943 F.2d at 979.
247. Id. at 988.
248. Id.
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tion on the part of the government and of casual judicial oversight
of the process.
B. Wiener's Theory
At this writing, one aspect of the Wiener case remains unexam-
ined - the remaining issues of triable fact. As indicated above, the
Ninth Circuit declined to rule on the question of summary judg-
ment.249 Wiener's contentions consisted primarily of allegations that
the FBI failed to justify its law enforcement (b)(7) exemptions.250
He challenged the agency's claim that the Lennon file was in fact
compiled for law enforcement purposes within the meaning of the
exemption.251 Now that the FBI has been directed to enlarge the
scope of its response, Wiener may be able to argue this point from a
position of greater strength. Additionally, Wiener disputed the
sincerity of the FBI's claims pursuant to Executive Order under the
(b)(1) exemption. He suggested that the actual reason for the
agency's Executive Order withholdings was to avoid executive em-
barrassment, a purpose expressly forbidden by the Order.252 To sup-
port his allegation, Wiener offered certain documents which he was
able to obtain from the FBI. The documents included a memo from
FBI Director Hoover expressing his concern that Lennon might not
be deported back to England before the 1972 Republican Conven-
tion; a memo from Acting FBI Director Gray suggesting that a nar-
cotics arrest would provide a basis for Lennon's immediate deporta-
tion and indicating the weakness of the INS's case for deportation
at that time; and a memo to a United States Senator suggesting the
strategic termination of Lennon's visa as a "counter-measure"
against antiwar and anti-administration protest groups.253  The
Ninth Circuit ruled that without an adequate Vaughn index, these
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. Section 1.6(a) of Executive Order 12,356 provides that "[i]n no case shall information
be classified in order to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; to prevent
embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; to restrain competition; or to prevent or delay
the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security."
Exec, Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166, 170 (1983).
253. Wiener, 943 F.2d at 988; see also Appellant's Reply Brief at 14-15, Wiener (No. 88-5867)
(contending that the FBI monitored John Lennon not because of its belief that he might partici-
pate in unlawful activities, but as a means of facilitating the reelection of Richard Nixon). Wiener
suggests that "it is government conduct of this type that led to the passage of the Freedom of
Information Act." Id. at 15.
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
contentions could not be properly addressed. 54 However, given the
court's newly evident intolerance for pretextual, weak, or bad faith
agency justifications, Wiener's allegations are likely to receive seri-
ous consideration on remand. The Wiener court demonstrated a
clear determination to honor the spirit of FOIA and to put teeth
into the Vaughn requirements. If the agency fails to come up with a
justification that satisfies the new test, the court may simply order
that the information be released.
Wiener's story provides a good example of the kind of scenario
FOIA was meant to address. As a citizen and a scholar, Wiener
sought to avail himself of his statutorily created right to access pub-
lic information. When his request did not yield full disclosure, he
pursued his statutory remedy and filed suit. Under Vaughn, the
agency had the obligation to produce an index which explained and
correlated its refusals and purported justifications. After significant
delay, the proffered index grossly failed to meet Vaughn standards.
Nevertheless, the district court failed to enforce the Vaughn man-
date. Wiener turned to the court of appeals where the issues re-
ceived the kind of scrutiny for which FOIA provides. In the face of
noncompliance, the court was obliged to take a didactic approach to
the problem. Three decades after the enactment of FOIA, perhaps
Wiener will help produce the intended result - that when informa-
tion is requested, agencies are either to disclose the information or
specifically show why they should not.
V. IMPACT - TOUGHER REQUIREMENTS MAY LEAD TO A
REDUCTION IN FOIA LITIGATION
Wiener signals the Ninth Circuit's renewed commitment to the
spirit of FOIA. In order to give effect to FOIA's intent, this court
has recognized the need to tighten Vaughn index requirements and
decrease the degree of deference traditionally accorded to govern-
ment agencies.
FOIA was conceived in an attempt to facilitate access. Legislative
history and judicial interpretation support FOIA's proposition that
the government should indeed be answerable to the people.2 55 Many
legislators, jurists, and scholars agree that democratic values are
well served by a policy allowing citizens to monitor the workings of
254. Wiener, 943 F.2d at 988.
255. See supra notes 11-32 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose and spirit of
FOIA).
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their government.256 The Watergate scandal, the Iran-Contra hear-
ings, and the recent confirmation hearings of Justice Clarence
Thomas serve as vivid examples of how dramatically the nation re-
acts to withheld information that is suddenly and reluctantly re-
vealed. While recognizing the inevitability of shrouding certain in-
formation in secrecy to protect national security, financial interests,
and privacy concerns, FOIA balances these interests with the coun-
tervailing interest in promoting maximum disclosure. Judicial review
gives effect to FOIA's intent.
Despite the desirability of disclosure, FOIA has not been easily
interpreted. When the first version of FOIA was enacted in 1966, at
least one scholar foresaw difficulties in its interpretation, a predic-
tion borne out by subsequent litigation.257 When faced with FOIA
reviews, courts were besieged with virtually unmanageable quanti-
ties of documents submitted by agencies claiming exemptions. In or-
der to rule on the propriety of these claims, detailed and time-con-
suming in camera examinations were required. Government
agencies had no guidelines for proper justification, leaving the bulk
of the burden on the reviewing courts.
The Vaughn court fought back against this tide of burdensome
lawsuits. Vaughn provided a framework for adequate government
affidavit submission and articulated one circuit's firm policy to re-
fuse to shoulder the government's responsibilities. The court re-
turned the burden of proof to agencies, where FOIA's enactors in-
tended that it belong. The legislators, believing that disclosure
should be the rule, allocated to the agencies the burden of evaluat-
ing and categorizing information prior to reaching a decision about
revealing it. The agencies were also to bear the burden of justifying
an unfavorable decision. Vaughn forced the agencies to accept these
burdens and refused to allow them to shirk their statutory responsi-
bilities. A strong policy emerged from the Vaughn decision - the
D.C. Circuit would not aid and abet agencies in avoiding or under-
mining the intent of FOIA.
All other circuits have willingly adopted the Vaughn index. How-
ever, practice showed that while Vaughn provided a skeletal
blueprint, it failed to clarify with specificity how an exemption
256. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974);
HR. REP. No. 1497, supra note 13, at 12, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2429; Miles, supra
note 17.
257. See Davis, supra note 14, at 765.
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should be properly documented in order to allow informed advocacy
and judicial review. An idea was articulated and a method identi-
fied, but clear guidance was still lacking.
Wiener fills in the details that the Vaughn blueprint lacked. Wie-
ner provides an intricate road map to Vaughn indexing, complete
with negative and positive examples and extended analysis. While
Vaughn signaled the end of the era of conclusory affidavits, Wiener
goes on to remove the residual ambiguities left by the former deci-
sion. Wiener puts agencies on notice that any nondisclosure must be
supported by a detailed justification. The justification must provide
sufficient information to allow the requester to challenge agency de-
cisions. This means that the agency must reveal everything short of
the actual information which, in good faith, it believes to be exempt.
If the courts begin to treat Wiener as the next logical step after
Vaughn, the way in which FOIA disclosure is approached will un-
dergo substantial changes. Under the Wiener guidelines, withhold-
ing can never be a more convenient alternative. In the past, an
agency could save time and resources by denying a request and rely-
ing on the courts to uphold conclusory justifications. Under Wiener,
this will no longer be tolerated. The Ninth Circuit has signaled its
refusal to accept blanket claims of exemption. If government agen-
cies choose to follow Wiener guidelines in good faith, the quantity of
FOIA litigation could be significantly reduced. Borderline requests
may be less likely to receive denials in light of the extensive justifi-
cations that Wiener requires. The degree of detail required to justify
an exemption under Wiener translates into significant expenditures
of time and effort for the government. Accordingly, unless agency
officials identify compelling reasons for withholding information, the
justification process may simply be too burdensome in all but the
most genuinely disputed cases. Agencies contemplating less than
good faith responses might reconsider and heed Wiener's warning
not to hide behind statutory exemptions in order to shield informa-
tion that might embarrass the government. In any event, requesters,
agencies, and courts will know how to proceed to satisfy Vaughn
requirements and what to expect from proper de novo judicial re-
view. The net effect of Wiener should be to promote disclosure, and
to expedite and reduce litigation. Such a result benefits both reques-
ters and agencies alike - by allowing the former to promptly obtain
the information sought, and by reducing the number of denials that
the latter will deem worth pursuing, thus decreasing their FOIA re-
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lated workloads. All of this serves to effectuate the simple purpose
of FOIA - to allow the public to receive information compiled by
its government.
CONCLUSION
Despite FOIA's laudable goal of making access to information the
rule rather than the exception, it has proved to be a fertile source of
litigation. Burdens have been imposed on all parties. Requesters
often must file suit to compel disclosure. Agencies must sift through
voluminous documentation, defend their determinations, and bear
the burden of proving the applicability of claimed exemptions. Dis-
trict courts must devote time and energy to conducting de novo re-
views and frequent hearings on remand. Appellate courts must re-
view, interpret, and analyze the lower courts' findings. Obviously, all
of these endeavors require the expenditure of public and private
resources.
If agencies made a practice of voluntarily responding in the spirit
of disclosure mandated by FOIA, much of this litigation might be
avoided. However, realism demands the recognition of good faith
differences of opinion as to the scope and meaning of FOIA exemp-
tions. When those differences arise, the courts must intervene. That
intervention would be greatly facilitated by diligent adherence to
Vaughn requirements, which have now been restated and sharpened
by Wiener. Adequate Vaughn indexing at the initial district court
level of review could expedite and limit litigation. Other circuits
may find the case a useful guide and utilize it to promote a higher
degree of compliance. In this way, uniform standards could be
adopted on a national level. Now that the United States Supreme
Court has declined to review Wiener, these standards have effec-
tively become law, and most doubt as to proper agency response in
both form and substance has been removed.
If Wiener becomes the new standard, perhaps the vision expressed
by Congress upon enactment of FOIA in 1966 will be more substan-
tially fulfilled. Our government's duty to be answerable to the peo-
ple will be reaffirmed.
Elizabeth A. Vitell

